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Abstract
After the subprime crisis, with the worsening of asset quality all around Europe, a lack of harmonization emerged concerning 
credit classification, monitoring, provisioning and writing-off in the banking industry. A wave of analysis and new regulations 
by the Supervising Authorities aimed at highlighting best practices and creating a common standard, in order to enhance 
transparency and accounting data comparability across the European Union. A point of particular attention concerned the 
usage of forbearance measures and the classification and provisioning of forborne positions. This paper deep-dives into this 
issue leveraging on the public dataset disclosed by the European Banking Authority, following the 2018 EU-wide Transpar-
ency Exercise. The purpose of this paper is twofold. On one side, we want to gauge the extension of the forbearance measures’ 
usage among a sample of major European banks and the drivers of this usage. On the other side, we want to analyze which 
main factors impact on the loan loss provisioning of forborne positions.
Keywords Forbearance measures · Loan loss provisions · Non-performing loans · Asset quality · Collateral · Credit risk
Introduction
Banks often approve concessions or modifications to previ-
ous loan conditions. Some of these modifications are just 
motivated by commercial reasons and aim to retain clients 
who would otherwise move to competitors. Other conces-
sions are related to financial difficulties of the borrowers and 
are technically called forbearance measures. Their objective 
should be either to prevent or help resolving problematic 
loans, safeguarding the bank’s exposure. A misuse of for-
bearance measures may be related to disguising non-per-
forming positions, thus avoiding to burden the profit and 
loss statement with loan loss provisions.
Forbearance measures are the core topic of this research 
paper. The purpose of our analysis is twofold. On one side, 
we want to gauge the extension of the forbearance measures’ 
usage among a sample of major European banks that took 
part to the EU-wide Transparency Exercise undertaken by 
the European Banking Authority in 2018. We will compare 
different types of banks and different countries in order to 
understand the drivers that lead to a wider or lesser weight 
of the forborne exposures as a percentage of the total loan 
portfolio. Furthermore, we want to analyze which main fac-
tors impact on the loan loss provisioning of forborne posi-
tions. The final goal of the two analysis is to understand 
if the forbearance measures are used properly by banks 
across Europe and if the higher credit risk that is inevitably 
inherent to forborne positions is well reflected in the level 
of loan loss provisions. A side purpose is also to gauge if 
the harmonization effort exerted by European Supervising 
Authorities reached the goal of smoothing the differences 
across countries, even though the full effect shall be visible 
in a few years.
Context and literature review
The topic of forbearance measures is important and has been 
studied in the literature from two different points of view: 
micro and macro.
From a microeconomics perspective, the main questions 
addressed are: how do banks classify forborne positions 
and provision them to cover for the expected credit losses? 
Are forbearance measures used in a proper way by banks, 
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i.e., as an instrument to prevent or cure problematic credit 
exposures?
From a macroeconomics perspective, the issues analyzed 
are: what are the potential consequences of an extensive 
usage of forbearance measure on growth and optimal alloca-
tion of financial resource? Which are the exogenous factors 
that may push banks to use forbearance measures more?
The main starting point of the first wave of studies was 
the subprime crisis which began in 2007 in the USA and 
had many long lasting effects on the financial and economic 
environment all over the world. One of these effects was 
the tremendous worsening of the credit quality of banks’ 
lending portfolios and the consequent increase in the stock 
of non-performing exposures across Europe [22, 23]. The 
phenomenon clearly worried the Supervisory Authorities 
and pushed them to analyze the issue attentively, in order 
to better evaluate the dimension of the problem and devise 
potential solutions. In particular, a comprehensive survey 
was carried out by the Basel Committee for Banking Super-
vision [8]. What the Supervisors found out during this deep-
diving exercise scared them even more. They found out a 
sort of jungle characterized by a wide range of practices in 
credit evaluation, classification, monitoring, provisioning 
and writing-off across different banks and national banking 
systems. The differences were so huge to prevent the pos-
sibility to compare different credit institutions, especially 
if located in different countries. The Basel Committee for 
Banking Supervision [8] described the problem in caustic 
terms: “One of the lessons learnt from the financial crisis is 
that supervisors and investors could not always understand 
and compare information about credit categorization pre-
sented in banks financial statements. Banks used different 
(and often undisclosed or insufficiently disclosed) method-
ologies and assumptions for valuations, provisioning and 
risk weightings, increasing opacity and reducing compara-
bility for end users.”
Among many other aspects, one crucial issue was the 
different use and treatment of forbearance measures. The 
general understanding is that forbearance is a change of the 
contractual terms of a loan motivated by the financial dif-
ficulties of the borrower. Given this general definition, there 
are many details, which can make a dramatic difference on 
how the operation is granted, valued and represented in the 
books: which kind of measures qualify as forbearance? A 
change in the contractual terms of a loan, negotiated with 
a client who is not in financial difficulty, is to be consid-
ered as a forbearance? How shall a forborne exposure be 
classified: performing, non-performing or should a special 
different category be used? May a non-performing position 
be reclassified to performing status as a consequence of the 
approval of a forbearance measure? How does the approval 
of a forbearance measure affect the loan loss provisioning 
of the exposure?
The consequences of different approaches to the above-
mentioned questions may deeply affect the representation 
of credit risk exposure. The European Banking Authority 
[10–16] well remarked: “In the current recessionary eco-
nomic environment, asset quality has been a concern lately 
through; (a) the potential misuse of forbearance to avoid the 
recognition of some losses; (b) the lack of harmonized defi-
nition of forbearance and non-performing exposures which 
prevents meaningful comparisons of asset quality between 
institutions. […] This issue also creates uncertainty for the 
markets: there is no standard against which to compare the 
soundness of banks’ exposures to enable identification of 
more robust institutions. As a result, the lack of harmonized 
definitions contributes to the general feeling of distrust 
regarding the asset quality of European Banks as a whole.”
Based on the described findings, the Supervising Author-
ity started a structured harmonization process that gave rise 
to the issuance, in 2017 and 2018, of various Guidelines, 
Regulations and Technical Standards, published by the 
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision [7], the Euro-
pean Banking Authority [10–16] and the European Central 
Bank [16–19]. In particular, the forbearance measures were a 
focus of great interest and much effort was devoted to create 
a clear normative framework for this tool. The features and 
the classification of forborne positions were described in 
extreme details, in order to foster a common understanding 
and to force banks to use this instrument properly.
The specific empirical literature on the drivers of forbear-
ance and provisioning of forborne positions is very limited. 
To our knowledge, the most exhaustive contribution on the 
topic is Homar et al. [20]. This paper analyzes the usage of 
forbearance measure and the coverage of these positions as 
a function of various elements: macroeconomic variables, 
quality of banking supervisions, collateral valuation and 
bank’s financial strength.
Moving to the macroeconomic perspective, the activity 
of loan restructuring and forbearance is a core focus in the 
literature stream concerning the so-called zombie firms, i.e., 
firms that should be dead, but are kept alive by banks that 
extend, modify and restructure their exposures beyond any 
reasonable expectation of recovery. There is quite substan-
tial evidence that—during the last two decades—a relevant 
surge in the phenomenon of zombie firms took place in 
Europe and in other advanced economies [2, 9, 10]. Accord-
ing to Banerjee and Hofmann [4], the increase amounted 
approximately to 10 percentage points (from 2 to 12%) from 
the late 1980s across 14 developed countries.
The most frequent life-supporting devices for these zom-
bie firms are forbearance measures that are approved by 
financing banks without duly taking into consideration the 
viability of the new repayment plan and the realistic pos-
sibility for the borrower to continue operating as a going 
concern.
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Deep-diving into the specific literature on the topic, the 
first contributions focus on the Japanese market where the 
zombie firms phenomenon was identified as one of the main 
root causes of the so-called lost decade.
Moving to the European context, Andrews and Petrou-
lakis [3] show that zombie firms are more likely to be con-
nected to weak banks that are more reluctant to recognize 
non-performing positions, thus burdening their already 
fragile income statements. They also find, similarly to Ada-
let McGowan et al. [1], that the phenomenon is stronger in 
countries where insolvency regimes and creditors’ protection 
are weaker. Banks, in this context, would have less incentive 
to adopt hard workout strategies due to the low expected 
cash flows from recovery.
Storz et al. [24] claim that zombie firms, when associated 
with weak banks, tend to increase their debt exposure even 
further. Any policy intervention shall consequently address 
the deleveraging of both banks and firms.
Our work belongs to the first described stream of the 
literature, adopting a micro-perspective, and builds on the 
paper of Homar et al. [20]. What we add is a specific focus 
on how the forborne positions are classified and the driv-
ers of this classification. The new harmonized rules clarify 
that a forborne position may classify either performing or 
non-performing and specify the criteria which should be 
followed to make this decision. We want to verify if the 
national context and the bank’s financial features matter 
not only for the extent of forbearance usage—as already 
emerged in previous literature—but also on the specific clas-
sification of these exposures.
Sample description
The data used throughout the paper belong to the EU-wide 
Transparency Exercise undertaken by the European Bank-
ing Authority (EBA) in 2018. The Exercise comprised 130 
major banking institutions from 25 countries and collected 
data from the consolidated accounts at the 31 December 
2017 and the 30 June 2018. Along with a Risk Assessment 
Report, EBA disclosed the entire database of bank-to-bank 
information on capital positions, risk exposure amounts and 
asset quality.
Table 1 presents the structure of the dataset by country 
and total amount of the loan portfolio. First, we can notice 
a concentration of the sample in four major countries (Ger-
many, Spain, France and Italy) where over 40 percent of 
the banks are located and approximately 56 percent of total 
loan portfolio. Confronting the number of banks and their 
weight on total loans, it is evident that the United King-
dom—even though represented with a limited number of 
institutions—covers a relevant quota of lending activity. By 
adding the share of loans granted by British banks, we reach 
a coverage of 75 percent. The credit exposure toward non-
financial companies (last two columns in Table 1) is quite 
extensive in most countries: 34 percent on average, with 
peaks above 40 percent in Italy, Austria and Greece. To our 
goals, this part of the loan portfolio is particularly interesting 
because the frequency and potential impact of forbearance 
measures are more relevant.
Table 2 analyzes the lending portfolio quality, the weight 
of positions with approved forbearance measures and the 
coverage of loan loss provisions over total carrying amount 
both for non-performing and forborne positions. First, we 
can notice that the share of positions with a forbearance 
measure varies sensibly among the different countries taken 
into consideration. However, at the first sight, the phenom-
enon seems strictly related to the amount of non-performing 
loans. Apparently, a change in contractual terms is quite a 
standard tool to face transitory or structural financial dif-
ficulties of the borrowers. The correlation between the NPL 
and forborne ratio, on a bank-by-bank basis, is very high and 
amounts to 0,88.
On the contrary, what is quite varied is the share of for-
borne positions that is classified as non-performing. It is 
worth to remind here that, even according to the new harmo-
nized framework, banks can maintain a position performing, 
after approving a forbearance measure, if there are good 
chances that the borrower will be able to comply regularly, 
according to the new contractual arrangement. However, it 
is not possible to upgrade a position to performing status as 
a mere consequence of the forbearance measure, because a 
probing period has to pass and some conditions need to be 
fulfilled before doing so. The data shown in Table 2 seem 
to indicate that either the compliance to the new harmo-
nized rules is still incomplete or the prevailing interpreta-
tion in quite varied on a national basis. The proportion of 
forborne exposures classified as non-performing goes from 
levels above the 80 percent in Greece, Poland, Hungary and 
Bulgaria to levels below 40 per cent in Norway and Finland.
Finally, Table 2 shows that the coverage of forborne posi-
tions is quite substantial and close to that of the non-per-
forming portfolio. Such an evidence is fully coherent to the 
fact that the approval of a forbearance measure ultimately 
indicates a situation of financial difficulty and the need to 
find a solution either to overcome a non-performing status 
or to prevent it. Even with this general evidence, the last 
column of Table 2 shows that the gap of coverage between 
non-performing and forborne portfolio varies significantly 
from country to country. The analysis that follows aims to 
deepen the understanding of the phenomenon and the drivers 
underpinning the loan loss provisioning.
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Methodology
After the qualitative description of the phenomenon pre-
sented so far, we want to explore more in depth the usage 
of forbearance measures and the loan loss provisioning 
associated with these concessions. In particular, we want to 
address three main research questions.
First question: Which are the drivers that lead 
to a wider or lesser usage of forbearance measures 
by different banks?
The dependent variable in this analysis is the FORB_RATIO, 
which is the proportion of positions with an approved for-
bearance measure over the total carrying amount of loans 
to non-financial corporations. We assume that a higher 
weight of non-performing positions may push the bank to 
try and solve the situation by rescheduling the debt or oth-
erwise modifying the original terms of the contract. Thus, 
we expect a positive sign for the regressor NPL_RATIO. 
We then want to check if banks characterized by a larger 
loan portfolio and/or by a higher exposure to small-medium 
companies tend to use more frequently the forbearance 
measures. We expect larger banks to have a richer set of 
tools to manage the non-performing portfolio, which could 
reduce the recourse to forbearance. As the set of workout 
strategy available and actively used could increase more 
than proportionally with the dimension of the bank, we use 
the natural logarithm of total assets as a regressor and we 
expect a negative sign. Likewise, we expect a larger share 
of SME’s loans to be related to a lower frequency of for-
bearance, since the smaller dimension of single exposures 
will discourage the administrative burden of a renegotia-
tion and push toward portfolio solutions, based for instance 
Table 1  Sample distribution by 
country and total loan portfolio 
(31 December 2017)
Countries Banks in the sample Total loans Loans to non-financial 
corporations
# % Mln Eur % Mln Eur %
Germany 20 15.38 2,571,584 13.02 744,672 28.96
Spain 12 9.23 2,346,998 11.88 696,405 29.67
France 11 8.46 4,322,327 21.89 1,352,937 31.30
Italy 11 8.46 1,677,558 8.49 747,119 44.54
Sweden 7 5.38 1,017,531 5.15 381,168 37.46
Austria 6 4.62 372,941 1.89 153,725 41.22
Belgium 6 4.62 452,117 2.29 111,191 24.59
Netherlands 6 4.62 1,639,899 8.30 563,359 34.35
UK 6 4.62 3,647,401 18.47 870,403 23.86
Luxembourg 5 3.85 21,529 0.11 529 2.46
Portugal 5 3.85 178,760 0.91 67,009 37.49
Denmark 4 3.08 550,790 2.79 171,129 31.07
Greece 4 3.08 224,435 1.14 105,683 47.09
Ireland 4 3.08 197,356 1.00 63,898 32.38
Ciprus 3 2.31 29,151 0.15 12,752 43.74
Iceland 3 2.31 22,513 0.11 10,674 47.41
Malta 3 2.31 9927 0.05 2734 27.54
Norway 3 2.31 198,047 1.00 77,635 39.20
Slovenia 3 2.31 15,095 0.08 5517 36.55
Finland 2 1.54 122,555 0.62 41,393 33.78
Poland 2 1.54 85,672 0.43 25,686 29.98
Bulgaria 1 0.77 3631 0.02 2106 58.00
Estonia 1 0.77 1705 0.01 470 27.55
Hungary 1 0.77 29,292 0.15 9077 30.99
Romania 1 0.77 9195 0.05 3095 33.66
Total EU 130 100 19,748,011 100 6,220,366 31
Average 10 7.69 1,519,077 7.69 478,489 34.07
Stand. Dev. 4.37 3.36 1,222,698 6.19 364,835 10.41
Max 20 15.38 4,332,327 21.89 1,352,937 58.00
Min 1 0.77 1705 0.01 470 2.46
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on the sale of non-performing exposures. Finally, based on 
the results of the survey carried out by the Bank for Inter-
national Settlement [5], we expect a different frequency of 
forborne positions on a country basis, based also on the local 
normative framework that may make the tools more or less 
attractive for the banks. In particular, we control through 
specific dummies the effect of the bank being located in 
Italy, France, Germany, Spain and Great Britain. We do not 
consider individually other countries because of the lim-
ited number of banks in the sample. In line with Homar 
et al. [20], we expect to find a higher percentage of forborne 
positions in countries characterized by lax bank supervision. 
We control for a set of macroeconomic parameters for each 
country in the dataset, including the growth rate of GDP and 
the SME’s value added, as a proxy of the relevance of small 
and medium enterprises in the country where the bank’s 
headquarters are located. All indicators are 1-year lagged, at 
31 December 2016, since the effect of a changing economic 
environment over credit portfolios and resulting banking 
strategies would reasonably not be immediate. We expect 
a wider usage of forbearance measures when the economy 
is growing at a faster speed. In fact, in such a context, more 
time and flexibility allowed to the problematic clients could 
result in a higher recovery rate or in a full resolution of a 
temporary difficulties. We expect forbearance measures to be 
less common in countries characterized by a wider presence 
of small and medium enterprises. The “culture” of using 
such concessions could be relatively more diffused in coun-
tries where the average dimension of companies and credit 
exposures is larger. Finally, we control for the strength of 
legal protection of creditors rights, which could reasonably 
influence the choice of alternative workout strategies. To this 
end, we use the Strength of legal right index computed annu-
ally by the World Bank, on a scale from 1 to 12. The empiri-
cal evidence emerged in the “zombie firms” literature points 
to the fact that lower legal protection of creditors increases 
Table 2  Loan portfolio’s 
quality, forbearance measures 
and loan loss provisions (31 
December 2017)












Germany 5.06 4.53 74.38 44.86 32.85 12.02
Spain 7.82 7.71 61.86 50.19 31.47 18.73
France 5.16 1.80 69.42 52.89 31.95 20.93
Italy 18.42 7.83 73.71 51.36 29.58 21.77
Sweden 1.83 2.33 51.78 34.62 15.86 18.76
Austria 5.97 4.08 69.79 50.42 35.19 15.23
Belgium 5.50 2.92 68.85 51.34 34.01 17.33
Netherlands 4.89 4.18 62.38 30.17 18.44 11.73
UK 3.08 2.16 68.35 43.14 25.01 18.13
Luxembourg 1.61 0.02 0.00 43.27 0.00 43.27
Portugal 29.60 20.17 76.67 53.70 40.33 13.37
Denmark 4.03 3.06 58.04 24.84 17.56 7.28
Greece 51.41 22.81 82.53 50.34 33.45 16.89
Ireland 13.72 10.26 74.84 31.64 25.52 6.12
Cyprus 49.33 36.41 72.08 48.96 28.64 20.31
Iceland 3.69 6.37 40.11 44.22 16.38 27.84
Malta 8.73 7.48 64.21 43.59 25.65 17.95
Norway 3.80 7.14 33.04 34.18 8.18 26.00
Slovenia 25.69 19.03 84.96 63.68 53.71 9.97
Finland 1.89 1.01 38.08 42.48 9.27 33.21
Poland 10.49 4.71 84.11 50.39 36.07 14.32
Bulgaria 25.29 18.55 87.38 45.56 42.81 2.74
Estonia 3.00 0.00 NA 20.61 NA NA
Hungary 14.79 7.64 81.73 55.76 50.54 5.22
Romania 13.23 10.45 76.09 56.80 45.09 11.71
TotalEU 7.77 4.75 69.04 48.14 29.29 18.85
Mean 12.53 8.36 64.94 44.89 28.67 17.19
SD 13.83 8.66 20.13 10.39 13.34 9.13
Max 51.41 36.41 87.38 63.68 53.71 43.27
Min 1.61 0.00 0.00 20.61 0.00 2.74
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the tendency to prolong agonies through unjustified conces-
sions and restructuring measures. We thus expect a negative 
sign for this regressor.
Second question: Which are the drivers 
that lead banks to classify forborne positions 
as non‑performing to a wider or lesser extent?
The dependent variable in the second analysis is FORB_
NPL, which is the percentage of forborne positions classified 
as non-performing. In this second analysis, the core aspect 
is the effect of location, i.e., the country dummies. Differ-
ent national practices and stance by the supervisors could 
have an effect on the more or less prudent classification 
of forborne positions. We control for the FORB_RATIO, 
the NPL_RATIO and the interaction between the two. We 
expect a positive sign for the regressor NPL_RATIO, since a 
lower asset quality of the bank will most probably reflect in a 
lower asset quality of the forborne portfolio. On the contrary, 
we expect a negative sign for the regressor FORB_RATIO. 
In fact, when the forbearance measure is more frequent, they 
are most probably used both as a strategy to manage non-
performing exposures and as a precautionary tool aimed at 
preventing a borrower from becoming non-performing. In 
this latter case, the positions may well remain in bonis even 
after the approval of the concession. Finally, the interaction 
between the NPL_RATIO and the FORB_RATIO aims to 
check if banks burdened by a higher level of non-performing 
positions tend to use more frequently the forbearance meas-
ures as a tool to prevent or delay the recognition of new 
problematic assets. The expected sign of the interaction is 
negative, since banks with a lower loan portfolio quality 
would tend to keep as much as possible the forborne posi-
tions into the performing category. We deem, in this second 
research question, the macroeconomic controls to be less 
relevant. On the contrary, we include the Strength of legal 
right index since the decision to classify a forborne position 
as performing or non-performing could also be influenced by 
bank’s trust in the possibility to recover the money through 
enforcement actions. The expected sign of the regressor is 
positive: the stronger the legal protection of creditors, the 
stronger the actions that will be taken by bank and con-
sequently the higher the probability that positions will be 
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Third question: Which are the drivers that affect 
the impairment level of forborne positions?
Ultimately, the approval of a forbearance measure points 
toward an increased riskiness of the borrower. Thus, the 
loan loss provisions should be substantial on this kind of 
exposure, which would typically belong to Stage 2 accord-
ing to IFRS9 accounting standard. In this third analysis, the 
dependent variable is IMPAIR_FORB that is the percent-
age impairment on the gross carrying amount of forborne 
positions. First, we expect the percentage coverage to be 
positively associated with the FORB_NPL variable. In fact, 
the amount of loan loss provisions should be higher for for-
borne exposures classified as non-performing. Second, we 
expect the impairment level to be negatively correlated with 
the amount of collateral assisting forborne positions. In fact, 
the collateral reduces the expected credit loss on the expo-
sures and thus justifies a lower level of provisions. Finally, 
we control for the effect of LOAN_SME variable. Since the 
exposures toward small and medium enterprises present in 
general higher credit risk, we expect a positive sign for the 
regressor, i.e., a higher coverage through loan loss provi-
sions. We include the macroeconomic controls to account 
for any difference in coverage policies related to national 
economic environment.
Table 3 summarizes the independent variables used in 
the analysis and the expected sign of each regressor in the 
framework of the three aforementioned research angles. 
As well remarked by Klees [21], the choice of variables to 
include in econometric analysis such as ours is always some-
what subjective and discretionary. There may always be an 
observed factor which bears on the phenomenon and that is 
not well captured. However, to the best of our knowledge, 
we deem that the main drivers are well represented in our 
analysis, both at country level and at bank-specific level, 
even tough with a parsimonious approach.
Results
Table 4 reports the results concerning the first research ques-
tion. Both regressions show a strong correlation between 
NPL ratio and forborne ratio. Thus, it is clear that the for-
bearance measures are quite a standard strategy to manage 
the financial difficulty of borrowers, before dismissing or 
writing-off the position. So, when non-performing loans 
increase, in parallel forborne positions tend to increase. On 
the contrary, the usage of this strategy as a preventive tool 
is less common. A prevailing precautionary nature would 
IMPAIRFORB = 0 + 1 × FORBNPL + 2 × COLLFORB
+ 3 × LOANSSME + 4 ×MacroeconomicControls
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in fact lead to a negative correlation between forborne ratio 
and NPL ratio.
The analysis shows no significant correlation between the 
forborne ratio and the dimension of the bank, measured by 
the logarithm of total asset, in contrast with what we were 
expecting. Apparently, larger banks make an intensive use of 
forbearance measures, even though they could in principle 
access to a richer set of strategies and tools to manage their 
non-performing portfolio. No significant link emerges either 
between the retail dimension of the loan portfolio and the 
forborne ratio. Among the macroeconomic controls, as we 
were expecting, the usage of forbearance measures is wider 
in countries characterized by a stronger GDP growth rate. 
In a positive economic and dynamic economic environment, 
financial difficulties are easier to solve and, consequently, the 
forbearance measures may be an interesting and effective 
tool to overcome temporary issues. On the contrary—and 
quite surprisingly—the Strength to legal rights Index is not 
significant, from a statistical point of view, even though the 
regressor shows the expected sign.
The R-squared of the first regression, in Table 4, is 
already very high, reaching the level of 86 per cent. None-
theless, the explicative power of the regression increases 
further—to 90 percent—when we add the country dummies. 
Among these dummies, the two significant ones are Italy and 
Spain, with different signs. Italian banks use forbearance 
measures less that the other banks in the sample, whereas 
Spanish banks use them more. For Italy, the effect is above 4 
percent and for Spain amounts to almost 3 percent. A poten-
tial explanation put forward by Homar et al. [20] refers to lax 
bank supervision. A stricter attitude of the Bank of Italy as 
opposed to a more flexible treatment of forborne positions 
by the Bank of Spain could explain why Italian banks refrain 
from negotiating concessions with borrowers in difficulties 
while Spanish banks make frequent use of this strategy. To 
support this hypothesis, Barth et al. [6] periodical survey 
on banking supervision around the world shows that, in the 
period 1999–2011, Italy increased largely both the index of 
supervisory powers and the index of external governance, 
whereas Spain remained unvaried on the first and tightened 
the second index, but to a lower extent than Italy.
Table 5 reports the results concerning the second research 
question. Once again, the variable NPL has strong expli-
cative power and the expected sign. Banks with a higher 
burden of problematic assets not only tend to use more for-
bearance measures, but also classify the resulting positions 
more frequently into the non-performing category. However, 
the negative sign in the regressor FORBORNE shows that 
banks intensively using the instrument of forbearance clas-
sify a large share of the resulting forborne positions into 
performing category. To explore more in depth this aspect, 
in the second column, the equation includes an interaction 
term between NPL ratio and forborne ratio. The variable is 
strongly significant and has a negative sign. This means that, 
when both the burden of problematic loans are higher and 
the bank uses intensively forbearance measures, a lower per-
centage of forborne positions goes into the non-performing. 
The interpretation of this evidence suggests an opportunistic 
usage of the instrument of forbearance aimed at disguising 
the poor asset quality of the bank. This opportunistic behav-
ior would intensify when the problem is more severe and the 
situation of the loan portfolio more deteriorated.
Table 3  Independent variables: definition and expected signs
Name Definition Expected sign
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
NPL Percentage non-performing loans on total carrying amount of the portfolio of 
loans to non-financial corporations
+ +
LOG_ASSET Natural logarithm of bank’s total asset −
LOANS_SME Percentage of loans to SMEs on total portfolio of loans to non-financial 
corporations
+ +
FORB_RATIO Percentage of exposures with an approved forbearance measure on the total 
carrying amount of the portfolio of loans to non-financial corporations
−
FORB_NPL Percentage of exposures with an approved forbearance measure that are classi-
fied as non-performing
+
COLL_FORB Collateral available in percentage of total carrying amount for forborne expo-
sures
−
GROWTH_GDP 1-year lagged growth rate of GDP (2016) in the country where the bank’s 
headquarter is located
+ −
SME_VA 1-year lagged percentage of GDP created by SMEs (2016) in the country 
where the bank’s headquarter is located
− +
CREDIT_PROTEC 1-year World Bank Strength of legal rights index (2016) in the country where 
the bank’s headquarter is located
− +
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Looking at the country dummies, in this case the only 
significant one is Germany where, apparently, the percent-
age of forborne positions classified as non-performing is 
significantly higher than elsewhere. The Strength of legal 
right Index is significant and positively associated with the 
share of forborne positions classified as non-performing in 
both specifications.
Table 6 reports the results concerning the third research 
questions, i.e., the determinants of the impairment level 
of forborne positions. In a nutshell, we could summarize 
Table 4  Determinants of the forborne positions’ weight over total 
loans to non-financial corporations
This table shows the results of estimating the follow-




















+  where 
the variables are defined as follows
FORB_RATIO:: percentage of exposures with an approved forbear-
ance measure over the total carrying amount of loans to non-financial 
corporations, for each individual bank in the sample
NPL: percentage of exposures classified non-performing over the 
total carrying amount of loans to non-financial corporations, for each 
individual bank in the sample
LOG_ASSET: natural logarithm of total asset for each individual 
bank in the sample
LOANS_SME: percentage of loans to small and medium companies 
over the total carrying amount of loans to non-financial corporation, 
for each individual bank in the sample
GROWTH_GDP: 2016 growth rate if GDP in the country where the 
headquarters of the bank are located
SME_VA: 2016 percentage of values added produced by small and 
medium enterprises in the country where the headquarters of the 
bank are located
CREDIT_PROTEC: 2016 World Bank Strength of Legal Rights 
Index in the country where the headquarters of the bank are located
D_COUNTRIES (Italy, Germany, France, Spain and Great Britain): 
dummy variables whose value is equal to 1 if the individual bank is 
located in the country and 0 otherwise; ε: assumed normally distrib-
uted error term with zero mean and constant variance
The T-statistics are in brackets under the estimated coefficients. *: 
two-tailed probability < 0.1; **: two-tailed probability < 0.05; ***: 








































Adjusted R-squared 0.86 0.89
Observations 118 117
Table 5  Determinants of the forborne positions’ classification in the 
non-performing category
This table shows the results of estimating the following OLS regres-
s i o n :
FORB_NPL = 0 + 1 × NPL + 2 × LOG_ASSET + 3 × LOAN_SME + 4 × LOANS_ON_ASSET
+ 5 × NPL_RATIO × FORB_RATIO + 6 × DCOUNTRIES + 
where the variables are defined as follows:
FORB_NPL: percentage of forborne positions classified as non-per-
forming
NPL: percentage of exposures classified non-performing over the 
total carrying amount of loans to non-financial corporations, for each 
individual bank in the sample
NPL * FORBORNE: interaction term between NPL Ratio and For-
borne ratio
CREDIT_PROTEC: 2016 World Bank Strength of Legal Rights 
Index in the country where the headquarters of the bank are located
D_COUNTRIES (Italy, Germany, France, Spain and Great Britain): 
dummy variables whose value is equal to 1 if the individual bank is 
located in the country and 0 otherwise; ε: assumed normally distrib-
uted error term with zero mean and constant variance
The T-statistics are in brackets under the estimated coefficients. *two-
tailed probability < 0.1; **two-tailed probability < 0.05; ***two-






























Adjusted R-squared 0.17 0.29
Observations 111 111
What drives the greater or lesser usage of forbearance measures by banks? 
by saying: nothing new under the sun. The coverage level 
is higher when the forborne position is classified as non-
performing, thus indicating a more severe situation of 
financial distress. The average impairment level is higher in 
banks having a credit portfolio more tilted toward small and 
medium enterprises, since the expected recovery is lower for 
this kind of exposures. The impairment level is lower when 
the positions are covered more extensively with valuable col-
lateral. The macroeconomic controls and the country dum-
mies—unreported in Table 6 for the sake of space—are all 
statistically insignificant. The only surprise is the Strength of 
legal right index that does not appear to be associated with 
the impairment level. The level of credit protection seems to 
bear more on the kind of workout strategy chosen, more than 
on the forecast of potential loss given default.
Conclusions
The paper focuses on the usage of forbearance measures, 
on the classification of the resulting forborne positions and 
on their loan loss provisioning, based on the dataset of the 
EU-wide Transparency Exercise carried out by the Euro-
pean Banking Authority on a sample of 130 major banking 
institutions.
The analysis confirms that forbearance measures are a 
tool frequently used by European banks. More than a pre-
cautionary instrument to prevent default, these measures rep-
resent a strategy to manage the non-performing portfolio. 
In fact, a strong statistical correlation emerges between the 
NPL ratio and the weight of forborne exposures. In terms of 
localization, Italian banks tend to use forbearance less and 
Spanish banks more than the rest of the sample. A potential 
explanation could lay in the different severity of local Super-
visory Authorities.
The analysis concerning the credit classification of 
forborne positions suggests an opportunistic usage of the 
instrument of forbearance aimed at disguising the poor asset 
quality of the bank. In particular, this opportunistic behavior 
tends to intensify when the problem is more severe and the 
situation of the loan portfolio more deteriorated.
In terms of provisioning, no particular criticalities 
emerge. The impairment level is higher when a larger share 
of forborne exposures is classified non-performing, whereas 
it is lower when these positions are well collateralized.
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